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Four Women of Egypt: Memory, Geopolitics and the Egyptian Women’s Movement 
during the Nasser and Sadat Eras  
SARA SALEM 
 
This article addresses the Egyptian women’s movement of the 1950s-1970s through a recent film entitled 
The Four Women of Egypt, which focuses on the lives of four prominent Egyptian women active in the 
movement during that period. Using the concept of political memory, the article traces some of the major 
debates within the women’s movement throughout this era. By focusing on the ways in which these women 
conceptualize the geopolitical, I show that the twin concepts of imperialism and capitalism were central to 
the ways in which they understood gender. The result was a complex understanding of how gender intersected 
with Egypt's position within a broader global system of imperial capitalism. Following the transition in the 
1970s to an open-market economy, the women's movement shifted away critiques of imperialism and 
capitalism. This shift can only be understood in terms of geopolitics - the rise of neoliberalism in Egypt. 
New neoliberal policies had dramatic effects on the women’s movement, showing why both the rise and fall 
of the movement must be contextualized geopolitically and transnationally.  
 
The 1950s saw Egypt gain independence from Britain and establish its first independent 
government, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Free Officers. Memories of this period can often 
be nostalgic, as a time during which there was a strong women’s movement <1> that was active 
and that managed to achieve crucial gains. In this paper I raise several questions about the Nasser 
years and the women’s movement, and argue that in order to understand the ways in which it has 
been remembered, we need to look at the geopolitical situation on the one hand, the women’s 
movement on the other, and the ways in which these constituted one another. What was the role 
of geopolitics in the Egyptian women’s movement during the 1950s and 1960s, and how did this 
build on feminist activism of the previous era? How did this particular geopolitical context impact 
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the ways in which feminists negotiated difference and what does this reveal about sites of 
contestation? Finally, how did the shift to an open-market economy in the 1970s affect feminist 
organizing and in turn construct the 1950s as a time of intense activity and advancement?   
 Numerous scholars have pointed to the importance of regional and international factors in 
the development of the Egyptian women’s movement (Hatem 1992, 1994; Baron 2005; al-Ali 2000; 
Badran 1999, 1998). I argue that in the case of the Nasser era, many feminists focused on 
geopolitics via the concepts of imperialism and capitalism, and that this stemmed from the 1952 
revolution and the focus on Egyptian independence. This particular era also saw rich debates 
around Marxism and socialism, and this too impacted the ways in which Egyptian feminists debated 
issues of gender as it provided a structural lens through which to understand inequality. Gender 
liberation was understood through the lens of independence—in the broadest sense of the word. 
There was an explicit critique of “Western feminism” that saw gender as the main axis of 
oppression that united women universally, and a clear articulation of nationalism, anti-imperialism 
and anti-capitalism as the main problems facing women of the Global South. This in turn allowed 
Egyptian feminists to engage in transnational activism with other Arab and Third World women, 
a process that had already begun during the 1920s and 1930s when Egyptian feminist alliances with 
Western women began to break down because of disagreements over the imperial question. 
Similarly, the decline of the movement that was dominant in the 1950s and 1960s should also be 
contextualized within geopolitical changes, including Egypt’s transition to an open-market 
economy, the demise of state feminism and what Islah Jad has termed the “NGO-ization” of the 
Arab women’s movement (2004), all of which played a role in shifting the focus of feminist 
organizing away from imperialism and capitalism. 
 In order to demonstrate the ways in which some of these issues were articulated, I use a 
documentary called The Four Women of Egypt, directed by Tahani Rached. <2> This documentary 
charts the political trajectories of four women who were active in the Egyptian women’s movement 
during the transition from Nasser to Sadat, and thus is a useful lens through which to analyse this 
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shift in geopolitical terms. The narratives of these women suggest that the geopolitical changes that 
accompanied this shift can explain the decline in a focus on imperialism and capitalism within the 
women’s movement. Alongside this documentary, I use sources on Egypt’s feminists in order to 
present a sketch of the women’s movement before the 1950s, as this provides important context 
for understanding the women’s movement of the 1950s and 1960s, and the experiences of the 
women in the film. 
 
Remembering the Egyptian Women’s Movement: The Nasser Years 
 
The 1940s-1960s were a period of immense political, social and economic change across Africa 
and the Middle East, largely due to the rising momentum of nationalist anti-colonial movements. 
Much has been written about the involvement of women in these movements, usually highlighting 
their active involvement during the movement and then their rapid side-lining following 
independence. This narrative has appeared in Egyptian feminist historiography in writings on how 
women’s demands during the 1919 revolution were side-lined by Egyptian male modernists (Baron 
2005; Badran 1998). While this narrative is certainly an important part of the story, it is also useful 
to look at how Egyptian women themselves articulated their involvement in the nationalist anti-
colonial struggle, as well as their responses to the Nasser regime and its aftermath. Engaging with 
this is one way of putting together the various snapshots we have of Egyptian women’s history, 
and allows us to fill the gaps in the historiography of Egyptian leftist women (Hammad 2016, 119). 
 This period seems to represent a moment that is often returned to; a moment that is often 
remembered, especially for the intensity of women’s activism. Women active during this time were 
able to articulate their cause and connect it to other causes in ways that contextualized gender 
oppression within other structures such as colonialism and capitalism. Memories of this period are 
also important to interrogate in light of the disappointments that came after the moment of 
euphoria. In other words, any nostalgia that may be related to the specific moment in time—
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1952—is related to seeing it as a moment when everything seemed possible; a moment women 
were as much a part of as men. <3> The eventual culmination of this moment in the 1974 decision 
to open Egypt’s economy to foreign capital and the major societal changes that followed surely 
play a role in constructing the memories of feminists surrounding the 1950s. <4> 
 By the 1940s, the generation of feminists who made up Egypt’s first women’s movement 
had already begun to focus on questions of nationalism and independence. This generation, made 
up of pioneering women such as Huda Sha’rawi, Nabawiya Moussa, Malak Hifni Nassef and Ceza 
Nabrawi, had first focused mainly on issues such as education, work, seclusion, veiling, and issues 
of marriage and divorce— these were the issues that collectively became known as the ‘woman 
question,’ (Baron 2005, 31). This choice of issues revealed a clear class bias, and created a 
paternalistic and detached dynamic between these feminists and the majority of Egyptian women 
(Badran 1996, 4). However, geopolitical changes in the form of a deepening British occupation led 
many feminists to focus on the question of Egyptian independence. Egypt was at that time 
occupied by the British, and an expanding capitalist system was becoming an undeniable reality. As 
Margot Badran has written: 
 
In the second half of the nineteenth century Egypt experienced growing encroachment 
by the West in its economic life. British colonial rule interrupted the process of 
economic and social development begun under the direction of the previously 
autonomous Egyptian state. The political economy was redirected to serve British 
needs (1996, 11). 
 
It was during this period that feminists began to articulate gender equality as part and parcel of 
independence. This shift led to confrontations between Egyptian and Western feminists over the 
question of imperialism, a question not all Western feminists were comfortable confronting 
(Badran 1996, 13). The issue of Palestine, in particular, led to major disagreements that eventually 
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culminated in Egyptian feminists turning towards Arab feminism as a new space within which to 
build feminist solidarity. Power dynamics between British women inside Egypt and Egyptian 
women also contributed to the disintegration of ties between Egyptian and Western feminists, as 
Egyptian feminists realized that they had to contend with both patriarchal and colonial systems of 
power (Badran 1996, 39).  
 During the Nasser era, nationalism was a key theme and numerous feminists spoke of their 
experiences in the anti-colonial struggle (see: Zayyat 1960). This experience of nationalism was 
related to the experience of decolonization., and the turn towards Marxism by many Egyptian 
feminists can be contextualized within this larger milieu. The period of decolonization brought 
questions of imperialism and structures of domination to the fore; because of this, Marxism as a 
body of theory that focused on the global development of capitalism proved useful. It allowed 
feminists the analytical tools, including a means of analyzing class conflict, to analyze Egypt’s 
position vis-à-vis a rapidly changing world, and also provided a way of analyzing what many of 
them saw as the main problem facing Egypt: social inequality. Indeed this was a major feature tying 
nationalism, feminism and Marxism together: the identification of social inequality as the major 
problem facing the nation, with theories of class conflict as key to understanding how to address 
this. A key characteristic of this period, also connected to nationalism, was the proliferation of 
organizations and conferences that connected feminists across the postcolonial world, conferences 
at which global inequality was a central theme. The Bandung Conference is the most well-known, 
but organizations such as the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization were also key.  
 Discussions in the literature around gender during this period tend to focus on the 
emergence of state feminism as part and parcel of the new regime’s political program. Mervat 
Hatem has defined state feminism as “government efforts to remove the structural basis of gender 
inequality by making reproduction a public—not a private— concern and by employing increasing 
numbers of women in the state sector,” (1992, 232). While it is certainly true that there were clear 
benefits for the state in establishing such a dynamic with the women’s movement, it is also 
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important to interrogate why many women were drawn to the new regime that emerged in 1952. 
Indeed, as we will see, the four women in the film were not a part of the state feminist project and 
yet they were supportive of many of the demands of the 1952 revolution and the regime that 
emerged from it. This suggests that the discourse of state feminism had complex and contradictory 
effects, and that many women in the women’s movement were tied to it in complex ways. Indeed 
the key paradox of feminism under this regime was that it simultaneously gave women access to 
spaces in society they had long fought for—including work and education—while also closing 
down political space and extending control over independent organizations. Interestingly, however, 
as I will show, the four women did not refer to state feminism in their discussions of gender during 
the Nasser era. I suggest that this shows a different understanding of gender and how it is 
constituted for many feminists of this era. This seems connected to the focus on structural critique, 
specifically social inequality, in particular through the lens of Marxism. Indeed many of the women 
who were active during this period did not refer to themselves as feminists, nor were they referred 
to as feminists. But they did often refer to Marxism to frame their ideas. What seems to distinguish 
this era is not only the rapidly changing geopolitical terrain, but also the ways in which Marxist 
theory was consciously integrated into many of the struggles around the world, whether loosely 
through the work of people like Frantz Fanon, or more strictly through the work of people such 
as the Egyptian Marxists who were active during the 1950s and 1960s. This was a reflection of the 
usefulness of Marxist tools in analysing the massive structural changes taking place during 
independence. Because of these rich Marxist debates, particularly in countries that had been 
colonized, many nationalist movements turned to Marxism, thus bringing together nationalism and 
Marxist critique. Marxism provided the tools to understand the subjugation of colonized countries, 
and thus was particularly useful considering the role of nationalism in targeting that subjugation. 
<5> I return to this point in the conclusion. 
 The Four Women of Egypt is a film that follows the lives of four of Egypt’s prominent 
women who were active in the women’s movement during the Nasser years and subsequently. 
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Widad Mitri was a journalist and unionist; Safianaz Qassem a journalist and author; Amina Rachid 
a university professor; and Shahenda Maqlad an activist who has run for parliament several times. 
The film was directed by Tahani Rached and released in 1997. Methodologically I have approached 
this film as consisting of the oral histories of these four women. Produced in 1994—during the 
Mubarak years—it can in and of itself be seen as a nostalgic attempt to recount the Nasser years, 
years these four women clearly saw as central to the Egyptian women’s movement. “Oral history 
offered the delirious promise of brushing history against the grain, in Walter Benjamin’s famous 
phrase. Oral history promised a more democratic history. Oral history is potentially a technology 
for reproducing political memory, a technology accessible for the first time to the silenced, the 
inaudible, the disenfranchised,” (McClintock 1995, 310). It is the reproduction of political memory 
that I am interested in here, and this film provides a lens through which these four women do 
precisely that. 
I use the film to try to answer the questions posed thus far: how was geopolitics defined 
and articulated and how did this provide the four women with a means of critiquing what they saw 
as the problems facing Egypt? What were the sites of difference and contestation between these 
women, and what do they tell us about the women’s movement during this period? Finally, how 
do they theorize gender and how is this tied to the geopolitical changes Egypt underwent during 
the transition from Nasser to Sadat? The next section of this paper presents a series of snapshots 
into the discussions and narratives present in the film in order to bring to the surface some of the 
dominant questions these four women negotiated. The final section ties together the themes 
highlighted and connects them to Egypt’s changing geopolitical context, and suggests that Marxist 
theory, with its assumption that class differences drives social conflict, provided a lens through 
which to analyse the problems facing Egypt as a new nation, among these the problem of social 
inequality. 
 
The Four Women of Egypt  
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Amina Rachid, Safinaz Qassem, Widad Mitri, and Shahenda Maqlad all came from different 
ideological standpoints, a point that is made early on in the film. This does not seem to affect the 
common themes that they discuss throughout the film, nor the commonalities in the battles they 
faced throughout their lives. <6> In one instance, Qassem mentions that it is because of their good 
sense of humour that they all remained friends and managed to overcome ideological differences.  
 There are three themes that run through many of the discussions in the film. The first is 
the strong anti-colonial sentiment and activism of the four women, and the centrality of the 
Palestine question. The second is the constant negotiation over questions of class, and their own 
positionality within Egypt’s class structures. The third is the consistent comparison between the 
Nasser and Sadat eras. The discussions and anecdotes surrounding these three themes show that 
they are connected to one another and, moreover, that they inform the ways in which these women 
understand gender and gender inequality. 
 The question of Palestine was one of the key issues of the Nasser period. It was understood 
that the British occupation of Egypt, the formation of the state of Israel, and the emergence of 
American imperialism were key components of women’s activism. Organizations such as the 
“Women’s Popular Resistance Committee” were formed, and prominent personalities such as Ceza 
Nabarawi and Widad Mitri were key members. Mitri speaks of this organization, noting that it was 
formed in 1951 in order to take part in acts of resistance against the British occupation. The focus 
on Palestine dates back to the 1940s, during which feminists such as Huda Sha‘rawi were active in 
mobilizing around Palestinian liberation (Badran 1996, 223). This issue created significant tension 
between Egyptian and Western feminists, who often side-stepped the Palestine question and on 
the whole tended to ignore the imperial reality they were all enmeshed in (Ibid). This concern with 
Palestine continued into the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed in the film a shot shows an article written by 
Mitri in the 1960s that states: “While the construction of the [Aswan] Dam is a great victory of the 
will, our true victory will be to regain Palestine.” Safinaz Qassem connects the issue of Palestine to 
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Nasser, pointing out that although he had promised to liberate Palestine, he had either lied about 
it or failed to do so. 
 Abdel Nasser represents an important figure to the women active during this period, and 
is present in many of their discussions. His anti-imperialism and the discourse of “Arab socialism” 
proved relatable to the majority of Egyptians for whom social justice and economic independence 
were central concerns. As Shahenda Maqlad notes, Nasser’s land reforms led to many changes in 
the countryside. She and her husband Salah Hussein led an uprising against feudal landlord family 
el Feqqi in the village of Kamshish in the Nile Delta. Her husband was assassinated by one of the 
landlords, in an event that was to galvanize peasants across the country in pushing for land reform. 
This land reform eventually became a reality under Nasser, although it failed to restructure relations 
between peasants and landlords. 
 In the film the women recount their memories of the 1952 revolution in detail, and the joy 
and excitement that characterized that moment. The film shows a clip of Nasser summarizing the 
goals of the revolution: 
 
There are six goals. To put an end to colonialism, to put an end to feudalism, to put 
an end to exploitation of capitalism, to have a social justice (sic), to have a strong 
national army for the people, and to build up real democracy. 
 
Mitri connects these goals to the women’s movement, by pointing out that the women’s movement 
in Egypt has always demanded the right for women to vote and be elected to office as part of any 
real grassroots democracy. “In 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser extended this right to us,” she notes. 
“But of course, it didn’t just happen. It resulted from the struggle of generations and generations 
of women.” Here we see a nuanced view that does not match either the discourse of state feminism 
or the historiography of the Egyptian women’s movement—both of which ascribed to the state 
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the power to give women rights. Mitri instead underlines the fact that this victory came from the 
women’s movement itself. 
 Many feminists during this era had fierce debates about Nasser, <7> some of which 
focused on his authoritarian tendencies. Indeed Nasser shut down most independent political 
organizations, including the Egyptian Feminist Union, and notable feminists such as Doriya Shafik 
and Inji Aflaton were jailed for criticizing the new regime. In the film, however, the debates 
surrounding Nasser focused on whether he had truly made Egypt independent. In one scene 
Qassem speaks about one of the regime’s most celebrated projects, the Aswan Dam: 
 
To the people’s demands there was always the response: ‘After the Aswan Dam, wealth 
will flood the nation. After the Dam, there will be electricity everywhere. Always after 
the Dam. To the point we thought it would work marvels.  
 
Despite her reservations, Qassem still makes it clear that she supported the revolution and that it 
represented a moment during which a different Egypt became possible, in which “our dreams 
would be fulfilled,” pointing out that Nasser was a big part of the dreams of her generation. 
Describing his funeral, which they all attended, she said: “We sang the same song, felt the same 
pain, the pain of having lost him, and of what he made us suffer.” Here it is useful to pause and 
analyse how Qassem understands the geopolitical via her analysis of Nasser. Out of the four 
women, she is the most ambivalent about Nasser; in Qassem we thus see the painful reality of 
decolonization, captured through a shift in time. The moment of independence in 1952 was one 
of euphoria and one of hope—it was assumed that Egypt could now be independent not simply 
politically, but more importantly, economically. Although Qassem blames Nasser for failing to 
achieve this, it may be more useful to see it as an expression of the structural contradictions of 
decolonization, where imperial capital had already made inroads despite the emergence of 
independence Arab and African states. <8> Indeed Maqlad does this by contextualizing the 
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Nasserist period: she admits that mistakes were made—and that her husband paid for them with 
his life—but also notes that it was a specific historical moment during which many things were not 
clear. 
 It is notable that none of the four women refer to state feminism, as opposed to the 
literature on the Egyptian women’s movement, which mostly refer to Nasser through debates on 
state feminism. Instead the four women in this film refer to Nasser in a multiplicity of ways, all of 
which are connected to his economic and political successes and failures and not to his project vis-
à-vis the ‘woman question’ or state feminism; this is because they saw gender as interlinked with 
the broader changes happening under Nasser and not as separate from them. This raises interesting 
questions about the ways in which gender was understood by feminists of that era, who tended to 
focus on structures and their intersections; this could be why Marxism in particular posed a useful 
paradigm, as will be discussed in the conclusion. The ways in which these structures were seen as 
intertwined is important in light of the emergence of intersectionality over the past two decades. 
In their conversations, the women rarely refer to patriarchy, imperialism or capitalism as separate 
problems with separate solutions.  
 The second prominent theme that arises throughout the film is that of class positionality. 
The 1920s and 1930s had seen a very paternalistic dynamic between Egyptian feminists—who 
tended to come from the upper class—and working class Egyptian women. This was largely a result 
of the colonial situation, where upper class Egyptian women had greater access to education and 
their social influence and organizational capacities were greater. However, their class position 
meant that they often articulated notions of emancipation that were inspired by European and 
English models and that were out of touch with the reality of the majority of Egyptian women. 
<9> 
 Rachid opens the film by speaking about her upper class family and her upbringing in a 
villa surrounded by working class Egyptians. She recalls a memory of a girl throwing stones at her 
because of her grandfather, Ismail Sidqi, Egyptian Prime Minister at the time, and the fact that he 
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had signed a treaty that, in her words, “appeared to tie Egypt to the British and find a way for their 
presence to continue in Egypt.” The little girl threw stones at her school, and she recalls: “For me 
it was a shock and I’ve never gotten over it.” Reflecting on this incident, she says that the shock 
came from being attached by someone and realizing that the attacker was right: 
 
The big house, the poor neighbors. So this political drama was for me a shock and an 
awakening. In our big house we spoke French, and Arabic only with the servants. The 
bitter truth of being the ruling class. Outside the gate, a traitor.  
 
We thus see the class tensions that frame the ways in which some of the women related to the 
nationalist movement. The self-reflexivity Rachid engaged in is to be central to her own 
development. Her declaration further in the film that she identified with socialism and Marxism 
from a young age can probably be connected to this realization, and to her general awareness of 
her own class positionality—and all of its cultural baggage—vis-à-vis the majority of Egyptians. It 
was precisely because Marxism offered the tools with which Amina could understand class—so 
central to her experiences growing up—that she identified with it.  
 The new generation in the women’s movement tried to demolish this paternalistic 
relationship that had existed between Egyptian women’s activists and the majority of Egyptian 
women. Maqlad in particular is illustrative. Known as the “mother of the farmers,” Maqlad was 
part of the Peasant’s Union, and she mentions that her struggles against the landlords in Kamshish, 
discussed earlier, are some of her most important memories. Indeed in the film she takes us to the 
village of Kamshish, where she is received warmly, and shows us the exact place where the 
demonstrations against the landlords took place. “In 1961, land was taken from the feudal lords. 
Everything changed. For the peasants and farmhands, who previously were only day laborers, it 
was incredible.” Maqlad paid a high price, however: the loss of her husband. Mitri later in the film 
says: “Shahenda showed that there is nothing an Egyptian woman cannot do.” Here we see the 
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intersections between class, gender and nation: they were not seen as separate, but as intertwined. 
Similarly, Rachid recounts that Shahenda losing her husband Salah and the events surrounding the 
loss pushed others towards a more radical revolution. Maqlad notes that the events of Kamshish 
were what really brought the four women together, and Mitri clarified: “Not just us. Everyone.” 
The centrality of land reform, of Nasser’s promises, and of the nationalist project cannot be 
overemphasized. It was not separate from the women’s movement, but part and parcel of it. An 
interesting point about the Kamshish event is the fact that Che Guevera visited the village with 
Nasser, as Maqlad points out in the film, bringing light to the transnational dimension of anti-
imperialism that dominated in the 1950s.  
 What is important to note, however, is that the paternalistic relationship between feminists 
and working class women was somewhat lessened not only because of the articulations of feminists 
themselves, but because of the Nasserist project and the new material context it created. It was 
precisely the opening up of education to the masses, the guarantee of a public sector job, and the 
extension of the right to vote that leveled the playing field among women—to a certain extent—
in ways that were unprecedented. It is this material context—a result of state feminism—that 
allowed for a shift in the ways in which feminists articulated their visions and related to one another.  
The final theme is the transition to an open-market economy as Egypt’s geopolitical orbit 
shifted, showcasing how geopolitics not only resulted in different political economy inside Egypt, 
but also a different conceptualization for the women’s movement. In a telling scene where Qassem 
and Rachid are listening to a song playing on the gramophone, Qassem repeats the line of a song 
that goes: “That blows a soothing breeze on the foreign usurper,” and then says to Amina: “Look 
at us now.” This distinction between then and now is something that occurs throughout the film, 
and brings us back to the idea of memory. All four women spent time in jail during the Sadat years 
because of his crackdown on leftists, and the shift from Nasser to Sadat marked the end of 
Nasserism, both as ideology and material reality. The transition to an open-market economy, 
commonly referred to as Infitah (literally meaning ‘opening’), the emergence of a new bourgeoisie 
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dependent on real estate, rents, and financial speculation, and the 1967 defeat to Israel were all 
events that characterized this shift. Indeed Rachid refers to the “new rich”—a new class that largely 
made their money off real estate deals, a process she points out is not a form of “productive 
capitalism.” At the base of this shift were two major structural changes: a transition in the economic 
system, and a transition in Egypt’s geopolitical position. There was a move away from state welfare 
and state-led capitalist development to an individualization of the economic burden, the expansion 
of the private sector, and the liberalizing of the market. Indeed it was during this period that the 
groundwork for neoliberalism was put in place and peace with Israel in exchange for lucrative US 
aid to Egypt’s economy if it was to liberalize. This was to affect Egypt’s position globally: moving 
away from positive neutralism (Abou el Fadl 2015) and anti-imperialism, Egypt now turned 
towards the United States. The peace treaty that was signed with Israel—despite its extreme 
controversy among Arabs and Egyptians—marked this new geopolitical orientation. 
In an important scene in the film, some of the villagers from Kamshish point to the fact 
that Egypt was seeing the dismantling of the agrarian reform initiated under Nasser. Farm rents 
were deregulated, and many could not afford the new prices. One villager said: “Capitalism hasn’t 
solved a thing. Or socialism. Or Islam, as they want to apply it. But we’re facing a shambles, a loss 
of direction.” It was this new moment that created uncertainty about Egypt’s future, and I argue 
that this contributed greatly to the framing of the Nasser era as a nostalgic one. This loss of 
direction led to a discussion among the four women about religious fervour, and the ways in which 
religion was being used to deal with this uncertainty. Indeed the 1970s are often portrayed as the 
decade during which there was an “Islamic revival.” 
It is surrounding this topic that we see one of the major disagreements between the women. 
In a scene towards the end of the film there is a heated discussion about Islam, where Qassem 
insists that Islam is a clearly defined religion, and criticizes Maqlad for her tendency to “use 
Qur’anic verses selectively.” Mitri, an Egyptian Christian (Copt), points out that when Safinaz and 
others say “Islam is the solution,” it brings up the question of what this means for Egyptian 
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Christians who are fulfilled by Christianity. It is this that leads to Mitri’s position that the Egyptian 
state should be neither Muslim nor Christian. The religious revival of the 1970s can be explained 
partly by the 1967 defeat to Israel and the social chaos that followed, as well as Sadat’s policy of 
strengthening Islamist forces in order to defeat the leftists. <10> Mitri’s statement that the 
Egyptian state should be neither Muslim nor Christian brings up the contested notion of 
secularism. It may be tempting to see Mitri’s point as support for a secular state as the most 
beneficial form of statehood for women. However, in light of her Marxist articulations in other 
parts of the film, it may be more useful to see her comments on religion in the state from the 
perspective of how anti-nationalist forces such as the British occupation had often used religion to 
crush moves towards independence. Many of Egypt’s pioneering feminists of the 1920s and 1930s 
espoused what they called secular views, not as an attempt to banish religion to the private sphere, 
but rather to counter the British colonial policy of divide and rule. These feminists often recognized 
that colonialism was premised on separating and favoring certain groups over others, and thus 
consciously strove to interrupt this by speaking as Egyptian women rather than as Christian or 
Muslim women. Some scholars have suggested that the Nasser era was also marked by a strong 
secular anti-colonial project. Laura Bier, for example, has written that the Nasser era was marked 
by a clear division between secular and Islamist visions of feminism (2011, 43). While it is true that 
the memoirs of prominent feminists of the Nasser era, such as Latifa al Zayyat and Zeinab al 
Ghazali, suggest that there was a divide, this appeared to be more along the lines of a leftist-religious 
divide than a secular-religious one. Indeed it appears as though many of the feminists who 
identified as ‘secular’ were in effect staunch leftists. 
Although many feminists during this period discussed the cultural effects of imperialism, 
their focus tended to be on the hard economic and political reality. Qassem, for example, says: 
“Our ideal was the Western woman. Anyone but ourselves.” Here we see the effects of Western 
hegemony on gendered understandings in Egypt and the ways in which women felt pressured to 
adopt Western values in order to be considered modern. In a telling scene, Qassem says: 
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People [in the US] would ask me: ‘Why are you not dressed like them?’ I would ask 
them, ‘Like who?’ ‘Egyptians.’ ‘But I am dressed like them.’ They would tell me, ‘No, 
they’re veiled.’ At first I would challenge them: ‘No, we wear bikinis. No, we can be 
naughty too. We get into the same mischief as you. We’re civilized. Some of us drink 
alcohol and eat pork—not me. But some do, I swear. Some people go naked. We’re 
good people just like you.’  
 
The non-modern—Islam—is deemed to be open to interrogation. The modern—the US—is 
beyond interrogation; it is the norm. This touches on the old debate about the Orient as a space of 
non-modernity that must always justify itself according to standards set by those who are modern. 
 Many feminists linked this to changes in Egypt’s position geopolitically. Rachid points out 
that the influx of petro-dollars after President Sadat liberalized the economy led Egypt to an even 
stronger position of dependency. Importantly, she notes that this dependency was not just on the 
West, but also on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries and their rising use of ‘Islam’ as a bulwark 
against Nasser’s pan-Arab socialism. This new economic orientation had tangible social effects, as 
Amina Rachid notes: 
 
All of this has led to a new attitude about life, a ruthless individualism. […] A strong 
sense of helplessness.  
 
Qassem frames all of these changes within Western ideological hegemony: “The West is the 
dominant ideological and cultural power.” Amina responds by pointing out that she does not 
believe the West’s power is ideological or spiritual, but that it is “power politics, stating: “We know 
that if an Islamic force came to power and acted in the West’s interests, the West would embrace 
it.” Maqlad adds: “The multinationals and the big international financiers need to create an enemy.” 
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She thereby also locates the tension between the West and Egypt at the level of what Rachid calls 
power politics.  
 I think that it is useful to look at this two differing viewpoints as aspects of the same story. 
There is little doubt that the US exercises hegemony, and continues to do so. This hegemony, 
however, is not either ideological or political/economic: it is both at the same time, and must be 
both at the same time in order to subjugate massive areas of the globe. These views on US 
imperialism should also be contextualized within the decline of the Cold War and the rise of the 
US as a single superpower. This focus on US hegemony is also connected to the nostalgia for the 
Nasser era, an era commonly defined as socialist, pan-Arab/African, and anti-imperialist. Thus it 
is precisely geopolitics-understood-as-imperialism that dominates many of the discussions in the 
film.  
 
“We Were Defending Peasants and Palestine”: The Decline of Egyptian Resistance and Changing Geopolitical 
Circumstances 
 
The Four Women of Egypt was produced and released in the early 1990s, about halfway through Hosni 
Mubarak’s presidency. Although there are tensions surrounding the ways in which the four women 
see Nasser, there is also an element of nostalgia throughout the film that is interesting to probe. I 
suggest two interconnected reasons for why this nostalgia for the Nasser years is a feature of the 
narratives in the film: first, the geopolitical circumstances of the period of decolonization, and 
second the availability and popularity of tools that allowed for structural critiques of gender 
inequality.  
The themes that emerge from the film can be explained by situating these women within 
the historical moment of decolonization. As Maqlad notes, “We were defending peasants and 
Palestine.” Following this period there was the liberalization of the economy, which led to dramatic 
economic, political and cultural effects, not least among them the penetration of vast amounts of 
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foreign capital. <11> The 1970s saw the groundwork for neoliberalism being put in place in Egypt. 
Because of the 1967 defeat, social forces that had been pushing for market liberalization managed 
to get the upper hand over forces that favoured continuing the project of state-led capitalist 
development Nasser had implemented. This was also the period that saw a dramatic decrease in 
feminist activism and writing that focused on questions of class and imperialism.   
 These geopolitical changes had a very particular effect on the women’s movement. Some, 
such as Islah Jad, have written about the “NGO-ization” of the Arab women’s movement (2004). 
With the decline of the Soviet Union and many nationalist regimes across the Arab world and the 
rise of neoliberalism, as well as the funnelling of aid to Egypt as it entered the US fold under Sadat, 
NGOs spread exponentially. Jad rightly notes that rather than see this as proof of democratization 
or a challenge to authoritarianism, we should raise questions about what NGOization means for 
the women’s movement, arguing that through professionalism, a new set of elites decided which 
women’s issues should be focused on, and this has led to the immensely popular “gender 
mainstreaming” approach that has been widely funded by multiple organizations and that has 
become common sense in terms of gender and development (ibid). Donors favored concepts such 
as good governance, democratization and human rights, and allocated funds accordingly. It is not 
a question of Western control through NGOs, but rather a question of how neoliberalism dictates 
development agendas. Subversion of these agendas will always take place within the broad contours 
set by neoliberal development institutions themselves. “The formation of women’s NGOs with 
particular social aims marks a very different form and structure for Arab women’s activism from 
those that predominated in earlier periods,” (ibid). Although NGOs may attempt to subvert the 
conditions of donors, it is the logic of neoliberalism that is difficult to escape. This is why Marxist 
feminist groups such as Bint al-Ard and more recent feminist collectives such as Ikhtiyyar have 
refused funding, arguing it would compromise their work (Hammad 2011, 224). Indeed it seems 
as though the framing of gender justice has moved from a socialist-inspired one to a human rights 
inspired one, the latter an approach popularized by the influence of international donor institutions 
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(Hammad 2013, 229). These institutions focus on achieving particular outcomes—advocacy, 
awareness, media outreach—through particular tools—workshops, conferences, reports—within 
a particular time frame—short term—and for a particular audience—the target group and the 
donors (Jad 2004). It is these differences that delineate the contemporary period from the period 
these four women discuss.  
 When Safinaz says to Amina: “We are two friends who agree on the goals, but differ as to 
the means,” she sums up the way in which difference was articulated among these four women: as 
a productive disagreement concerning how struggle, which was common, should be waged. 
Emphasis on the common struggle allowed the women to navigate ideological and material 
differences in ways that ensured such differences remained productive. As Amina says in two other 
scenes: “We share the same fundamental values: the love of our country;”; “All of us are for social 
justice and equality…a return to a certain morality. But between the secularity of some of us, and 
the religious perspective of others, I think there’s a difference.” Here tensions are negotiated among 
their worldviews while retaining their solidarity with one another. 
 This notion of a common struggle that further connects these women to the broader 
transnational women’s movements of the time. The private papers of Mitri, for example—housed 
at the Women and Memory Forum in Cairo—are full of notes she took at international conferences 
on women’s justice. Many of these conferences were pan-Arab and pan-African. An interesting 
example of these connections is a visit Angela Davis made to Egypt, where she met with Egyptian 
women active in the women’s movement (Davis 1990). Davis’ visit to Egypt in the 1970s is an 
interesting example of this solidarity and shows the affinities between Black feminist approaches 
and Egyptian feminism. The responses from the Egyptian feminists she met show a shared concern 
with anti-imperialism, even if the articulations were different.  
 Earlier in the paper I posed the question of what separated this moment—the moment of 
decolonization—from other moments. What allowed for the understanding of geopolitics through 
the notions of imperialism and capitalism, which in turn allowed women across the globe to identity 
 20 
a common struggle? I want to suggest that these decades were also the height of the Marxist 
moment, both in academia and in social movements across the world. This refers not necessarily 
to Communist movements and parties, but more broadly to the rich theoretical debates and the 
complex applications of these debates within movements and resistance forces. It is no secret that 
the 1970s saw the decline of Marxism in terms of both theory and practice (or praxis). The 
neoliberal moment has played a key role in depoliticizing both the academy and social movements 
alike even if events such as the Arab uprisings of 2010/2011 demonstrated clearly the continuing 
relevance of class analysis, anti-capitalist politics, and social justice, despite attempts to represent 
the uprisings as simply about electoral politics or liberal democratic demands. <12>  
 Contexts such as Egypt are structured in specific ways that demonstrate that we cannot 
discuss gender relations without discussing their position within the global capitalist system. More 
orthodox versions of Marxist feminism assume that only by ending capitalism can the exploitation 
of women end (Engels, 2010). Contemporary Marxist feminist interventions have complicated this 
to show that patriarchy is not simply an effect of capitalism. However, the aim of dismantling 
capitalism remains, and it seems to me that this is an especially crucial point for contexts in the 
Global South. The women in the film articulate gender and gender equality as part and parcel of 
other structural inequalities. Sexism intersects with racism, nationalism, imperialism and capitalism, 
and it is here—in locating these intersections materially and ideologically—that Marxist theorizing 
has been particularly useful because of its analytical framework that centers inequality and power. 
Some women and organizations in Egypt have explicitly used Marxist theorizing to address social 
issues (Hammad 2013). Bint al-Ard is one example, and Hanan Hammad shows how they “analyze 
women issues as socio-cultural issues connected to the dynamic of gender as a social/sexual 
relation of domination in a patriarchal society and materialist conditions related to their roles in 
production and social reproduction and social class,” (Ibid, 224). These examples, however, remain 
few compared to previous decades and compared to the rhetoric of human rights that dominates 
Egyptian civil society. Perhaps the resurgence of Marxist theorizing will once again provide the 
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tools with which to redirect debates about gender towards structural inequalities and structural 
solutions. 
 
Notes 
 
1. It is important to note that the term feminist remains a contested one. For this reason, I will use 
“women’s movement” as a descriptor instead. While this paper focuses on the Egyptian women’s 
movement as a whole at certain points, the main emphasis is on the four women featured in the 
film under study. For a broader overview of the Egyptian women’s movement across time, see: Al-
Ali 2000.  
 
2. The release title is in French: Quatre femmes d’Égypte. 
 
3. Here it is important to note the gendered dynamics within such movements. Hanan Hammad, 
for example, has shown how the Communist movement in Egypt had very problematic gender 
dynamics and that indeed women have often been left out of the historiography of the left in Egypt 
(2016).  
 
4. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize, at the same time, that nostalgia remains a hegemonic 
representation of the Nasser period that minimizes the exclusions that the regime produced. 
 
5. See: Abdel-Malek, Anouar; and Ayubi, Nazih N.  
 
6. It could be argued that all four women represented different shades of the same ideology—
Nasserism—but this ignores both the fact that Nasserism as a force did not exist as early as the 
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1950s as well as the complexity with which some of the women, especially Safinaz Qassem and 
Amina Rachid, approach Nasser’s decisions. 
 
7. The debates surrounding Nasser and “Nasserism” have been seemingly endless, and it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to get into details of these debates. Instead in this paper I aim to show the 
ways in which these women—coming from different ideological dispositions—related to Nasser. 
For an overview of some of these debates, see: Abou-El-Fadl, Reem, 2015; and Kandil, Hazem, 
2012. 
 
8. For a particularly acute discussion of this, see: Nkrumah, Kwame, 1965. 
 
9. See the work on Qasim Amin as the best example of this: Amīn, Qāsim, 2000. Nawal el Saadawi 
has made a clear class critique by pointing to the ways in which history remembers the actions of 
upper class feminists, and ignores those of peasant women: “little has been said about the masses 
of poor women who rushed into the national struggle without counting the cost, and who lost their 
lives, whereas the lesser contributions of aristocratic women leaders have been noisily acclaimed 
and brought to the forefront,” (Baron 2005, 122). Additionally, Beth Baron has argued that it was 
middle class Egyptian women that pushed for political rights, since they did not have the same 
access to power as upper class women who were wealthy and well-connected (Ibid, 187). These 
nuances show how complicated the picture of the Egyptian feminist movement becomes when we 
take intersections of identity into consideration. 
 
10. See: Kandil 2012.  
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11. For a detailed discussion of the ways in which these changes impacted women and the labour 
market as well as the ways in which different classes of women were affected see: Hatem 1992, 
1994. 
 
12. See: Malak and Salem, 2015. 
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